+ China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is propping up private aerospace firms in an effort to attract former Western fighter pilots and exploit their expertise.
+ The espionage campaign is aimed at Western air superiority and it capitalizes on a number of potential vulnerabilities relating to U.S. fighter pilot retention and the privatization of the aerospace defense industry.
+ Chinese efforts to hide behind private firms should encourage both individuals and corporations in the Western aerospace and defense industry to be vigilant in their due diligence and identify potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hostile entities.
“Training distinguishes an army from an armed mob.”
–General Douglas MacArthur
As the variety of weapons used in modern warfare continues to grow, specialized knowledge and training become increasingly critical for the successful execution of military campaigns. Safeguarding this knowledge and training–keeping it hidden from hostile actors–has become more difficult in an age of increased military turnover and an expanding private sector defense industry. As defense and national security become increasingly integrated with the commercial sector, it also becomes increasingly difficult to prevent hostile entities from accessing advanced knowledge, training, and intelligence. Moreover, these developments have created new vulnerabilities that hostile entities can exploit. Within this context, the PLA has launched a significant espionage campaign with widespread implications for aerospace defense.
The PLA’s Weaponization of the Aerospace Defense Industry
On June 5th, the “Five Eyes” alliance—comprised of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada—released a joint bulletin highlighting efforts by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to deceptively recruit former Western fighter pilots as trainers and consultants for their military aviators and the PLA Air Forces (PLAAF). While the release of the rare joint bulletin underlines the gravity of the situation, it should come as no surprise to those monitoring recent geopolitical developments in Southeast Asia.
Warnings of PLA efforts to recruit Western talent have come to light in recent years. In October 2022, documents released by the U.K. Ministry of Defense revealed the Chinese government's connection to a private aviation training school, the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA). Upwards of 30 former U.K. military pilots were said to have trained members of the PLA through the TFASA and similar organizations. The American response to this espionage campaign spilled into the commercial sphere in June 2023 when the U.S. Commerce Department placed export restrictions on entities suspected of training Chinese pilots with Western aviators. This was a telling response, one that acknowledged the growing role of private corporations in the aerospace defense industry.
It is unsurprising that the PLA is seeking technical training for carrier operations in particular, as China’s competence in sea-based aviation operations lags behind that of Western powers.
The actions of the Commerce Department were not enough to deter Chinese efforts, however. In September 2023, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Charles Q. Brown Jr., who was then serving as U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, warned U.S. Airmen that the PLA was actively "seeking to exploit [their] knowledge and skill to fill gaps in their military capability." In this same memorandum, Brown asserted that the PLA's attempts to recruit Western pilots undermine the "vastly superior capabilities and overwhelming airpower" of the United States and its allies. Implicit in Brown’s statement is the acknowledgment that airpower remains one of the few areas where Western militaries, particularly the United States, maintain a significant advantage over the PLA. Consulting and training from Western experts could significantly diminish this advantage.
To understand the value of Western aviation expertise, one need look no further than the case of Daniel Duggan, a former United States Marine Corps aviator accused of training Chinese military pilots for the TFASA. While Duggan maintains his innocence in a case brought by the U.S. Department of Justice, he admitted to the Australian Broadcast Corporation that, while working for TFASA in 2012, he conducted “field carrier landing practice” with Chinese pilots. This included teaching approach and landing techniques that prepare pilots to land on aircraft carriers. It is unsurprising that the PLA is seeking technical training for carrier operations in particular, as China’s competence in sea-based aviation operations lags behind that of Western powers. Responding to the launch of China’s newest aircraft carrier, retired U.S. Navy Admiral Raymond A. Spicer assured Americans that China still had “a steep learning curve ahead of them.”
While this statement is certainly reassuring, it confirms that the PLA’s attempts to exploit Western talent are not a shot in the dark. The benefits they stand to gain from these efforts far outweigh any potential repercussions from a Western response. Organizing, consulting, or funding private flying academies is a relatively inexpensive task and one that requires little manpower. The multi-million-dollar budgets of these academies pale in comparison to the often highly classified knowledge and related training the PLA could receive from a Western aviator.
Identifying Vulnerabilities
That the PLA is taking advantage of several vulnerabilities impacting Western air power is undeniable. America’s fighter pilot retention crisis, for example, has left many highly-trained military aviators seeking alternative employment. Even if the impact is indirect, the abundance of former fighter pilots in the private sector increases the likelihood of success for the Chinese campaign. For the PLA, covertly attracting (or deceiving) a small number of these displaced pilots represents a significant win.
However, the issues related to the fighter pilot retention crisis are not the sole factors driving some into the arms of PLA-backed flight academies. Post-retirement career dissatisfaction is another key reason why former fighter pilots are vulnerable to recruitment by potentially hostile entities. After adrenaline-packed careers flying the most advanced jets in the world, many pilots find it challenging to adapt to life outside the military. This was the case for Dan Duggan, who, after leaving the Marine Corps, made a living giving tourists rides in fighter jets. Many aviators understandably jump at opportunities to continue flying fighters when they arise. The six-figure salaries offered by companies such as TFASA certainly makes the decision easier.
Contractors and non-contractors alike involved in aircraft, drone, or satellite operations must take material steps to defend against effective espionage disguised in plain sight.
Adding to this perfect storm of pride and financial incentives, the growth of private sector adversary air support services has further facilitated the PLA's efforts by providing the cover of a legitimate industry. In an age where private corporations have the ability to field fleets of jet fighters greater than that of some sovereign countries, offers to fly jets for private entities are no longer unusual for former military pilots. Retiring fighter pilots are now accustomed to job offers from companies such as TopAces, Draken International, Tactical Air Support, etc., who provide "Red Air" services for government clients. While these Red Air providers have no connections to the Chinese government, a PLA-controlled company could easily capitalize on the successes of these firms by presenting itself as a legitimate peer—and thereby lure in former pilots seeking to continue an exciting career.
Pilots or even commercial partners might not be able to recognize Chinese influence on a particular aerospace firm. Utilizing a strategy known as military-civil fusion, the Chinese government often relies on civil enterprises, which may have no discernible connection with the PLA, to provide them with knowledge, technology, and data originating from the private sector. In other words, in China there is no clear divide between the private and public sectors; instead, the two are complementary. Responding to the role of the private sector in Dan Duggan’s case, former British Member of Parliament Tobias Elwood remarked that this lack of clarity is “designed to lure people in.” The Five Eyes bulletin similarly reminds readers that "companies may not initially promote the PLA’s role" in their operations. Contractors and non-contractors alike involved in aircraft, drone, or satellite operations must take material steps to defend against effective espionage disguised in plain sight. This latest attempt by the PLA to exploit the aerospace defense industry will not be their last.
Implementing Countermeasures
The response to this espionage campaign should not be to eliminate collaboration between the private and public sectors on aerospace defense—doing so would be counterproductive. Rather, Western militaries and intelligence communities must be aggressive in identifying these espionage activities, and American companies more vigilant in their due diligence efforts.
Large traditional diligence companies excel at what they have done for decades but often struggle to adapt quickly as adversary strategies and methods evolve. Instead, Western companies should leverage specialized risk intelligence firms that extract hidden insights from vast amounts of open-source data (OSINT). These new companies use proven analytical frameworks and methodologies to “look around the subject,” mapping their connections and creating a narrative of the risk an individual or company might pose. These firms often combine the expertise of both geopolitical and industry specialists to provide highly tailored, relevant, and accurate visibility into a subject. This approach provides America’s top innovators with the awareness they need when developing products with national defense applications.
While this type of espionage is on the rise, our ability to detect and combat it is growing as well. As the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) conveyed to tech start-ups in late July, private corporations operate on the front line of national security. The NCSC urged emerging technology companies to “engage federal agencies and others [in their] industry to gather and share up-to-date threat information and risk mitigation resources.” Open-source risk intelligence firms leveraging geopolitical and industry expertise will play a crucial role in these efforts. The stakes are high: the superiority of existing and emerging Western technology and the specialized knowledge held by the West’s leading practitioners are critical to maintaining an edge over adversaries. As such, vigilance and proactive measures in safeguarding these assets are essential for national security.
